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* This article was invited for publication in the Chicago-Kent Law Review as part of a November 2019
Symposium on Alt-Labor. Roberto L. Corrada is Professor of Law and Mulligan Burleson Chair in
Modern Learning, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. The author thanks the Chicago-Kent
Law Review staff and all of the participants in the Alt-Labor Symposium, Michelle Penn, Sturm
College of Law Faculty Service Librarian for her invaluable and efficient assistance, and Russell
Kalvelage and Rebekah Nickel for their excellent research assistance, especially with respect to
portions of this article involving work study programs and the O’Bannon case.
1. O’Bannon v. NCAA (O’Bannon II), 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
2. Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. 1350 (2015).
3. In O’Bannon the court expressly stated that elite student athletes were in a labor market and
that the nature of the relationship between the athletes and their colleges was a transactional relationship
anticipating economic gain on both sides. O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 1065. In Northwestern University
the NLRB assumed arguendo that the students were employees and then declined to assert jurisdiction
for prudential reasons. 362 N.L.R.B. at 1350.
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The writing is on the wall. In the next few years, it seems clear now
that at least the elite student athletes in Division I power conferences in
college football and basketball, revenue-generating sports programs, will
be deemed employees for the purpose of determining college and
university legal obligations toward them. The inevitability of this sea
change in the way these athletes are viewed will be the culminating result
of various lawsuits as well as state legislation under a myriad of labor,
employment, and antitrust laws. The two most visible of these lawsuits so
far, O’Bannon v. NCAA 1 and Northwestern University, 2 quietly avoided the
direct question whether student athletes involved in the litigation were
employees when in each case a finding that they were students and not
employees would have resolved their claims and ended the litigation. 3 It
seems painfully evident in these two cases, as will be demonstrated in this
article, that the court in O’Bannon and the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) in Northwestern felt strongly that the student athletes involved
must in fact be employees or sufficiently employee-like to stay away from
a directly confronting the issue. Despite these developments, however,
courts still accept the argument that even elite student athletes are amateurs
and students, and not therefore employees. Although plaintiff-athletes have

42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 98 Side B

06/12/2020 13:18:38

8 CORRADA MACRO 1 EIC 5.4 (DO NOT DELETE)

188

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

6/5/2020 12:27 PM

[Vol 95:1

so far mostly lost in federal litigation, it seems clear that cases will
continue to be brought and that eventually these college athletes will
prevail because the amateur ideal of the college athlete at the very least in
sports that generate substantial revenue for schools is crumbling and
unsustainable at the same time that various legal tests of employee status as
well as simple economic reality reveal these athletes are truly employees. 4
More recent evidence of erosion in amateur status is found in state
legislation requiring that these athletes be allowed direct payment for use of
name, image, and likeness (NIL) by commercial entities. 5 After California
passed a law in September, and Florida threatened to pass the same law in
late October, the NCAA yielded to pressure and announced that it will
allow student athletes to receive NIL payments.6
The current landscape of labor, employment, and antitrust litigation
involving mostly elite college athletes in revenue-generating sports
represents a piecemeal approach to vindicating these students’ rights as
employees. As the NCAA’s primary defense that these particular athletes
are in fact amateurs falls apart, nobody has really focused on the perhaps
more interesting and fundamental question about what it will mean for
these students to be viewed as employees. How will their lives be changed?
Will they be able to retain an identity as a student? How will expectations
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4. See Richard T. Karcher, Big Time College Athletes’ Status as Employees, 33 A.B.A. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 31, 53 (2018) (“The Regional Director’s findings in Northwestern University and the NLRB’s
decision on review (declining jurisdiction without explicitly reversing the Regional Director) suggest
that Berger may have been decided differently if the plaintiffs were scholarship athletes in revenue
sports. In other words, Northwestern University strongly supports the position that scholarship athletes
in revenue sports are employees under the FLSA, even if non-scholarship athletes in non-revenue sports
are not university employees under the FLSA ‘economic reality’ test.”).
5. Steve Berkowitz, California Assembly Passes Bill that Brings State to Verge of Rules
Showdown
with
NCAA,
USA
TODAY
(Sept.
10,
2019),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/2019/09/09/california-assembly-bill-allows-college-athletesuse-likeness/2269869001/ [https://perma.cc/G6YG-CNGF]; Jeremy Bauer Wolf, One Step Closer to
Pay
for
College
Athletes,
INSIDE
HIGHER
ED.,
(Sept.
11,
2019.),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/09/11/california-passes-bill-allowing-athletes-be-paidname-image-and-likeness [https://perma.cc/GX5A-UX3T]. The California law goes into effect in 2023.
6. See Bobby Caina Calvan, Florida following California’s example, DENVER POST (Oct. 25,
2019), https://www.pressreader.com/usa/the-denver-post/20191025/281947429636251
[https://perma.cc/R9YU-TKPG]. The Florida proposed legislation is modelled after California’s. Id.
The biggest football states are likely to follow since none of them wants to cede a recruiting advantage.
Indeed, as this article was going to print, substantial NIL Bills had been introduced in Arizona,
Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin. The NCAA was quick to change course after
the possibility of Florida legislation was announced. See Ralph D. Russo, NCAA Allows profit for
athletes, but lots of questions remain, DENVER POST (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.pressreader.com/usa
/the-denver-post/20191030/281943134678345 [https://perma.cc/UP6D-72RR]. The NCAA Board of
Governors will allow student athletes to receive pay for use of their NIL. Id. However, the NCAA
Board “is emphasizing that change must be consistent with the values of college sports and higher
education and not turn student-athletes into employees of institutions. Id.
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7. The analysis in this article mainly focuses on football players in the FBS Division I Power 5
Conferences, but the conclusions would apply to any college sport that independently makes substantial
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change in the college field of play and in the locker room as a result of their
new status as employees who happen also to be students? What about
students in non-power conferences who might still be viewed as students
and amateur athletes? How will employee athletes be paid by colleges and
universities, and what will that mean with respect to the level of control
colleges and universities have over them? Will collective bargaining take
place in college, and, if it does, what will it look like? Will it be undertaken
on a national basis, a conference basis, or in individual schools? What will
student athlete employees and colleges and universities bargain over? In
attempting to answer these questions, this article will explore the brave new
alt-labor world of college football and basketball “employees” in revenuegenerating sports.
This article will begin by looking at some current and recent litigation
brought by college athletes against their respective universities as well as
recent state legislation that may affect their status as employees. Part I will
focus on what the courts, agencies, scholars, and state legislators have said
or implied about whether these athletes are or should be employees under
the law. This Part will demonstrate why the designation of athletes in
revenue-generating sports is fragile and cannot endure for much longer.
Part II switches and focuses on college “work study” programs, showing in
fact that there is nothing unusual or strange about having students work as
“employees” in college, and then showing how work study can serve as an
effective template for structuring the relationship between a college or
university and its football or basketball players. This Part shows that
colleges have very little to fear by treating these elite student athletes as
employees, and that such a transition can actually be a relatively easy one.
This Part explains how colleges and universities can treat these studentathletes as employees for work study programs by a minor change in
Department of Labor Regulations. Part III will take a look at how collective
bargaining in college might happen, what are likely to be the subjects of
bargaining, and why, in fact, union organizing and collective bargaining
rights for athletes in revenue-generating sports will be critical in the new
alt-labor world of college athlete employment.
Importantly, this article maintains only that student athletes in revenue
generating sports should be (and will be) classified as employees.
Generally, this means men’s college football and basketball players who
are grant-in-aid scholarship recipients on teams in Division I Power 5
Conferences. 7 It is precisely because these sports generate substantial
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revenue for schools that schools invariably treat these students more as
employees than as students. One need only review the comprehensive
factfinding regarding the Northwestern University football team to see that
this is the case. 8 With respect to sports funded completely by schools, there
is no such incentive for schools to treat these athletes as anything but
students. With respect to non-revenue generating college sports, the
amateur ideal of the college athlete can and should be preserved and
maintained.
I. IT’S COMING: ELITE COLLEGE ATHLETES AS “EMPLOYEES”
A. O’Bannon Chips Away at the NCAA and Amateur Status of Elite
College Athletes
The door was opened by the federal district court decision in
O’Bannon v. NCAA. 9 Ed O’Bannon was an accomplished NCAA Division
I forward for the UCLA Bruins from 1991 to 1995. One evening, years
after his basketball career had ended, while visiting a friend’s house,
O’Bannon saw his image on a video game being played by his friend’s
son. 10 The video game character was a perfect replica of O’Bannon.
Wearing O’Bannon’s former UCLA jersey and number, the virtual athlete
was a tall, slim, bald-headed and left-handed African American forward.
O’Bannon initially felt “pretty fired up . . . [and] thought it was pretty
cool.” 11 Regarding lack of consent and compensation for the use of his
likeness, O’Bannon forgot about the matter, “chalk[ing] it up as part of the
system.” 12 However, O’Bannon later came into contact with his longtime
42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 99 Side B
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money for the college or university. At that point, as I argue in this article, the sport is invariably treated
by the college or university as a commercial enterprise, and the athletes involved are effectively treated
as employees. For these players especially, the NCAA defense that they are not employees will soon
fall. That essentially means that college basketball athletes in the power 5 conferences should also be
viewed as employees. The Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) Power 5 Conferences include the ACC,
the Big 10, the Big 12, the PAC 12, and the SEC. These comprise approximately 65 football teams
including Notre Dame, an independent, counted as an ACC school for Power 5 Conference designation
purposes. See Full List of Division 1 Football Teams, NEXT C. STUDENT ATHLETE,
https://www.ncsasports.org/football/division-1-colleges
(last
visited
Dec.
20,
2019)
[https://perma.cc/QH8B-GFYA].
8. See Northwestern Univ., 2014-15 NLRB Dec. (CCH) P15781, 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221, at
*2-*9 (Mar. 26, 2014); Roberto L. Corrada, The Northwestern University Football Case: A Dissent, 11
HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 201, 203-07 (2020).
9. See O’Bannon v. NCAA (O’Bannon I), 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
10. See Villanova Univ., Examining O’Bannon v. NCAA, YOUTUBE (Apr. 29, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WgeyH5kSoF0 [https://perma.cc/5WK2-SKZV].
11. Id.
12. Villanova Univ., supra note 10.
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friend Sonny Vacaro, who asked him to be the named plaintiff in a lawsuit
against the NCAA on behalf of former student-athletes. Vacaro worked as
a Nike consultant in the late 1970s and was responsible for the marketing
scheme paying coaches to put their players in Nike sneakers. Vacaro was
involved in signing Michael Jordan to Nike and Kobe Bryant to Adidas. 13
However, despite being a key player in the commercialization of college
and professional basketball, Vacaro, a longtime opponent of the NCAA,
left his position with Reebok in 2007 to challenge the association’s
amateurism rules. 14
O’Bannon and others filed an antitrust lawsuit against the NCAA
alleging that its limits on player ability to receive payments for use of their
name, likeness, and image was a “restraint of trade” in violation of the
law. 15 The NCAA maintained that college athletes, as amateurs, are not
employees in a labor market, and thus their limits are lawful. O’Bannon
prevailed in the trial court. 16 The trial court found that NCAA rules limiting
player payments by commercial entities for the use of their name, image or
likeness unreasonably restrained trade in violation of antitrust law.17 In so
holding, the court made various findings related to the commercial nature
of the transactions taking place between these particular student athletes
and their colleges and the NCAA. 18 According to the court,

Moreover, according to the court, elite college athletes are in a labor
market for their services, one that prizes their ability to play football or

06/12/2020 13:18:38

13. Joe Nocera & Ben Strauss, A Reformed ‘Sneaker Pimp’ Takes On the N.C.A.A., N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/sports/ncaabasketball/a-reformed-sneaker-pimptakes-on-the-ncaa.html [https://perma.cc/5QB8-LX64].
14. Id..
15. O’Bannon I, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 955.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 963.
18. Id. at 988-93.
19. Id. at 988-89 (quoting Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 340-41 (7th Cir. 2012)).
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[w]hile it is true that many FBS football and Division I basketball
players do not pay for tuition, room, or board in a traditional sense, they
nevertheless provide their schools with something of significant value:
their athletic services and the rights to use their names, images, and
likenesses while they are enrolled. . . . The Seventh Circuit recently
observed that these “transactions between NCAA schools and studentathletes are, to some degree, commercial in nature, and therefore take
place in a relevant market with respect to the Sherman Act.” The court
reasoned that “the transactions those schools make with premier
athletes—full scholarships in exchange for athletic services—are not
noncommercial, since schools can make millions of dollars as a result of
these transactions. 19
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basketball for the school and a separate labor market for the use of their
name, image, and likeness for use in TV broadcasts and rebroadcasts and
for video games. 20 The court stated, “the sellers in this market are the
recruits; the buyers are FBS football and Division I basketball schools; the
product is the combination of the recruits’ athletic services and licensing
rights . . . .” 21 Thus, according to the court, the plaintiffs presented
sufficient evidence to show an anticompetitive effect in a “labor market.” 22
The trial court then formulated two remedies to address the antitrust
violation by the NCAA. First, the trial court ordered that the NCAA could
not cap the amount of grant-in-aid given to FBS football and Division I
basketball recruits at less than the full cost of attendance. 23 Allowing “cost
of attendance” scholarships significantly changes the amount that athletes
can be paid. 24 Second, the trial court ordered that the NCAA could not
prevent schools from depositing a limited share of revenues (up to $5,000
per player per year) generated from the use of their name, image, or
likeness into a trust fund that would payout upon the student’s graduation. 25
The trial court’s decision was then upheld by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, although one of the two remedies was struck
down by the appellate court. 26 According to the Ninth Circuit,
the rules here—which regulate what compensation NCAA schools may
give student-athletes, and how much—do relate to the NCAA’s business
activities: the labor of student-athletes is an integral and essential
component of the NCAA’s “product,” and a rule setting the price of that
labor goes to the heart of the NCAA’s business. Thus, the rules at issue
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20. Id. at 991-92. See also Rock v. NCAA, No. 1:12–cv–1019–JMS–DKL, 2013 WL 4479815, at
*11 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 16, 2013) (finding that plaintiff had identified a cognizable market in which
“buyers of labor (the schools) are all members of NCAA Division I football and are competing for the
labor of the sellers (the prospective student-athletes who seek to play Division I football)”); In re
NCAA I–A Walk–On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1150 (W.D. Wash. 2005)
(“Plaintiffs have alleged a sufficient ‘input’ market in which NCAA member schools compete for
skilled amateur football players.”).
21. O’Bannon I, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 991.
22. Id. at 993 (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 1007-08.
24. See Marc Tracy & Ben Strauss, Court Strikes Down Payments to College Athletes, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01/obannon-ncaa-case-court-of-appealsruling [https://perma.cc/QW6L-5BJZ] (“The cost of attendance, typically several thousand dollars more
than a traditional college scholarship, accounts for the financial demands of additional activities like
traveling home and back and paying cellphone bills.”).
25. O’Bannon I, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1008.
26. O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 1049. Chief Justice Thomas dissented in part, crediting expert
testimony in the trial court maintaining that the NIL fund payments to players of $5,000 was so small
that it would not have an anticompetitive effect on the sport. Id. at 1083. Thus, Thomas argued the fund
should have been upheld. Id. at 1079.
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here are more like rules affecting the NCAA’s dealings with its coaches
or with corporate business partners . . . . 27

Also, in finding that the NCAA’s limits on compensation violate the
antitrust laws, the court necessarily held that the rules imposed by the
NCAA are not “eligibility” rules, as the NCAA maintained, but restraints
on commercial transactions governed by antitrust laws and requiring a Rule
of Reason analysis:
In other words, the substance of the compensation rules matters far more
than how they are styled. And in substance, the rules clearly regulate the
terms of commercial transactions between athletic recruits and their
chosen schools: a school may not give a recruit compensation beyond a
grant-in-aid, and the recruit may not accept compensation beyond that
limit, lest the recruit be disqualified and the transaction vitiated. The
NCAA’s argument that its compensation rules are “eligibility”
restrictions, rather than substantive restrictions on the price terms of
recruiting agreements, is but a sleight of hand. There is real money at
issue here. 28

06/12/2020 13:18:38

27. Id. at 1066 (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 1065.
29. Id. at 1079. “The difference between offering student-athletes education-related compensation
and offering them cash sums untethered to educational expenses is not minor; it is a quantum leap.
Once that line is crossed, we see no basis for returning to a rule of amateurism and no defined stopping
point; we have little doubt that plaintiffs will continue to challenge the arbitrary limit imposed by the
district court until they have captured the full value of their NIL. At that point the NCAA will have
surrendered its amateurism principles entirely and transitioned from its “particular brand of football” to
minor league status.” Id. at 1078-79 (footnote omitted).
30. In re NCAA Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation, No. 14-md-02541-CW, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 52230 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2018).
31. See Sam C. Ehrlich, The FLSA and the NCAA’s Potential Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very
Bad Day, 39 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 77, 78 (2019); Eleanor Tyler, Know Your Judge: Claudia Wilken
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The court’s finding is that these students are in a labor market and that
their labor is part of a commercial transaction or exchange. The very strong
implication of this finding is that these students are employees. The Ninth
Circuit fell short of making such a finding, although it struck one of the
district court’s remedies because it felt that remedy in particular crossed a
line between viewing these athletes as students versus as employees.
According to the court, the creation of a trust fund into which schools
would put compensation for licensing a player’s name, image, and likeness
went too far toward treating the students as employees. 29 A number of
other antitrust suits have been filed against the NCAA in the wake of
O’Bannon. The Jenkins v. NCAA and Alston v. NCAA cases have been
consolidated into In re NCAA Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation. 30
These cases challenge the NCAA’s restriction on athlete compensation, and
are currently scheduled to go to trial soon. 31 These antitrust cases will not
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be discussed in this article simply because they do not tackle the question
of whether college athletes are employees head on. The O’Bannon case is
the exception because the litigation there is completed and the trial court
and Ninth Circuit findings do have some important implications, as
discussed above, for whether these college athletes should be viewed as
employees.
B. The NLRB Implies and Expressly Urges that Elite College Athletes
Should be Viewed as Employees
At around the same time that the O’Bannon case was working its way
through the courts, the Northwestern University football team filed a
petition with the National Labor Relations Board requesting a union
election. 32 Later that year, the NLRB’s Chicago Regional Director made a
determination that the players were “employees,” and Northwestern an
“employer,” under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), and
directed an election for a unit of players who were recipients of “grant-inaid” scholarships. 33 The Regional Director thoroughly analyzed the
relationship between the elite college football players at Northwestern and
the University itself in finding that the students were employees. 34
Applying the common law definition of “employee,” “a person who
performs services for another under a contract of hire, subject to the other’s
control or right of control, and in return for payment,”35 the Regional
Director (RD) easily found that Northwestern’s football players qualified as
employees under the common law test:

06/12/2020 13:18:38

Putting
NCAA
Amateur
Rules
to
a
Jury,
BLOOMBERG
LAW
(July
13,
2018), https://biglawbusiness.com/know-your-judge-claudia-wilken-putting-ncaa-amateur-rules-to-ajury [https://perma.cc/4EHV-PDY7]; Michael McCann, NCAA Amateurism to Go Back Under
Courtroom
Spotlight
in
Jenkins
Trial,
SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED
(Apr.
2,
2018), https://www.si.com/college-football/2018/04/02/ncaa-amateurism-trial-judge-wilken-martinjenkins-scholarships [https://perma.cc/DS2W-3M3H].
32. See, e.g., Daniel Uthman, College Athletes Take Steps to Form Labor Union, USA TODAY
(Jan. 28, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2014/01/28/college-athletes-playersassociation-northwestern-football/4958861/ [https://perma.cc/KL5B-P3LC].
33. Northwestern Univ., 2014-15 NLRB Dec. (CCH) P15781, 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221 (Mar. 26,
2014).
34. Id. at *38-67.
35. Id. at *39-40 (citing N.L.R.B. v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 94 (1995)); Brown
Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 490, n.27 (2004); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §2(2) (AM. LAW
INST. 1958).
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(1) Players perform services for compensation. The RD found that the
football team hugely benefits Northwestern in a number of ways,
including monetarily ($235 Million dollars over a 9-year period), and the
athletes perform for compensation in the form of grant-in-aid

42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 102 Side A

06/12/2020 13:18:38

8 CORRADA MACRO 1 EIC 5.4 (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

6/5/2020 12:27 PM

COLLEGE ATHLETES AND ALT-LABOR

195

scholarships (worth $76,000 per calendar year); 36 and (2) Players are
subject to the Employer’s Control. The RD details just how much these
athletes’ lives are controlled by Northwestern University. Not only do
they have to spend substantial hours engaged in football practice and
play, their private lives are also controlled by the University, and,
indeed, their student academic lives are also impinged by being on the
football team. 37

The RD distinguished cases involving graduate assistants. 38 In
addition to the RD decision in the Northwestern case, virtually all labor
scholars analyzing the issue have likewise concluded that these elite
college athletes meet the various legal definitions of “employee.” 39
The NLRB has at least impliedly taken the position that college
athletes are employees for purposes of the National Labor Relations Act.
On appeal, the NLRB in the Northwestern case, though refusing to assert
jurisdiction in the case, did strongly hint that the Northwestern Football
players may indeed be employees. 40 The NLRB stated that parties and
amici in the case largely focused on whether the scholarship players
involved in the case are statutory employees. 41 The Board also indicated
that if the athletes were not statutory employees, the NLRB would lack the
authority to direct an election or certify a representative. 42 In fact, if the
scholarship players were not statutory employees, the Board’s analysis in
that regard would seem to be the much better way to end the litigation.
However, the Board instead chose expressly not to decide the issue of
employee status, instead opting to decline jurisdiction based on a tenuous
line of cases arguably not supporting the Board’s ability to do so. 43 The
42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 102 Side A
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36. Northwestern Univ., 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221, at *41-44.
37. Id. at *45-49. The Regional Director did find however that “walk ons” were not employees
since they did not receive compensation. Id. at *49-51.
38. Id. at *53-59.
39. See, e.g., Richard T. Karcher, Big-Time College Athletes’ Status as Employees, 33 ABA J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 31 (2018); Marc Edelman, The Future of College Athlete Players Unions: Lessons
Learned from Northwestern University and Potential Next Steps in the College Athletes’ Rights
Movement, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1627 (2017); Cesar F. Rosado Marzan & Alex Tillett-Saks, Work,
Study, Organize!: Why the Northwestern University Football Players are Employees under the National
Labor Relations Act, 32 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 301 (2015); Jay D. Lonick, Bargaining with the
Real Boss: How the Joint-Employer Doctrine Can Expand Student-Athlete Unionization to the NCAA as
an Employer, 15 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 135 (2015); William B. Gould IV, Glenn M. Wong & Eric
Weitz, Full Court Press: Northwestern University, A New Challenge to the NCAA, 35 LOY. L.A. ENT.
L. REV. 1 (2014); Steven L. Willborn, College Athletes as Employees: An Overflowing Quiver, 69 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 65 (2014).
40. See generally Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. 1350 (2015).
41. Id. at 1351.
42. Id. at 1351-52.
43. Id. See also Roberto L. Corrada, The Northwestern University Football Case: A Dissent, 10
HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 201, 211-18 (2020).
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44. Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. at 1352 (emphasis added).
45. See Memorandum from Richard F. Griffin, Jr., Gen. Counsel, N.L.R.B, on the Statutory
Rights of University Faculty and Students in the Unfair Labor Practice Context to all Reg’l Dirs.,
Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers, N.L.R.B. (Jan. 31, 2017) (on file with the NLRB) (based on
the record developed in the Northwestern University case and other public information, “scholarship
football players in Division I FBS [schools] are employees under the NLRA”). This GC Memorandum
was later rescinded by President Trump’s appointed General Counsel Peter Robb on December 1, 2017.
See Memorandum from Peter B. Robb, Gen. Counsel, N.L.R.B, on Mandatory Submissions to Advice
to all Reg’l Dirs., Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers, N.L.R.B. (Dec. 1, 2017) (on file with the
NLRB).
46. 843 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 2016).
47. Id. at 294 (Hamilton, J., concurring).
48. Id.
49. Id.
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Board actually says in the opinion, “we have determined that even if the
scholarship players were statutory employees . . . it would not effectuate
the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction.” 44
The Board’s reticence to decide the issue of employee status suggests
some discomfort on the part of the Board to do so, perhaps suggesting the
NLRB at the time, and particularly Member Miscimarra, feared the answer
to the question might indeed be yes. Moreover, the NLRB’s decision to
avoid the question left intact the Regional Director’s comprehensive
discussion of the question as the Board’s only cogent analysis of the issue.
Importantly, after the Northwestern case, the NLRB’s General Counsel,
Richard Griffin, issued a Memorandum establishing that student athletes
are employees for the purpose of enforcing unfair labor practices against
the colleges and universities that employ them. 45
The idea that athletes in revenue-generating sports like Division I
football and basketball might be treated as employees while other college
athletes would not be has been articulated in at least one federal circuit
court opinion. Berger v. NCAA, 46 a case brought by track and field athletes
at the University of Pennsylvania alleging that the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) required their college to pay them a minimum wage, held that
the student athletes involved were not employees for purposes of the FLSA
since they are amateurs not entitled to compensation. However, Circuit
Judge Hamilton, concurring in the result in that case, explained that the
decision might be different for athletes in revenue-generating sports. 47
According to him, they might in fact be employees for purposes of the
FLSA. 48 As he explains, “I am less confident, however, that our reasoning
should extend to students who receive athletic scholarships to participate in
so-called revenue sports like Division I men’s basketball and FBS
football.” 49 Hamilton felt the outcome might be different in those cases
because those sports involve “billions of dollars of revenue for colleges and
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universities,” and therefore an analysis of the economic reality of that
relationship “may not point in the same direction” as in this case.50
Hamilton suggested that in the appropriate case, with a developed factual
record, the conclusion might be that there is in fact an employment
relationship. 51 Indeed, the extensive factual record developed by the
Regional Director in the Northwestern University case seems to have been
exactly what has caused the NLRB to lean in that direction. 52
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50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Interestingly, in a later FLSA case, Dawson v. NCAA, the plaintiff, Lamar Dawson, a former
University of Southern California football player, does make the argument that college athletes in
revenue-generating sports should be employees. In rejecting the argument, the District Court, without
any analysis, simply cites a string of decisions rejecting the premise that revenue generation is
determinative of employment status. 250 F. Supp. 3d 401, 407 (N.D. Cal. 2017). These decisions
involved providers of in-home care for public assistance recipients, volunteers at dance music festivals,
and student trainees at cosmetology schools. These employees and employers are hardly analogizable to
Division I football and basketball players. First, the employers in these cases operate student training at
a loss or are involved with state subsidies for public assistance. The dance music festival is a similar
for-profit enterprise, but the volunteers involved in that case are more like those working refreshment
stands at football games rather than the players themselves. In the dance music festival case, an analogy
might be made to college football and basketball if the employees involved were the rock stars or DJs
that are the focus of the event and that actually are the source of the company’s income. In any case, the
decisions cited are inapposite on the question whether college football or basketball players are
employees. In Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983),
the court does not reject analysis of profit generation as important in determining employee status,
rather the court says cases involving profit-seeking employers should not be automatically applied to
public social service agencies. The court’s analysis serves both to distinguish the case from being
applied to college students especially at private institutions but also to suggest that profit may indeed be
an important factor in assessing economic reality. In Valladares v. Insomniac, Inc., No. EDCV 1400706-VAP (DTBx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190028, at *24–27 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2015), the court
explains that revenue generation is irrelevant to deciding whether the employer in the case, Insomniac,
Inc., falls under the Amusement or Recreational Exemption (ARE) to the FLSA. The focus for that
exemption is the intermittency of the events run by employers, not revenue generation. The case is
completely inapposite to the question of the employment relationship between colleges, the NCAA and
college football and basketball players. The last two cases cited by the court involve student trainees at
a cosmetology school’s cosmetology clinic. In Jochim v. Jean Madeline Educ. Ctr. Education Center of
Cosmetology, Inc., the court found that a student trainee in a cosmetology clinic is not an employee
despite the school’s alleged profit from student labor. According to the court, “[t]he economic reality of
the relationship was that [the plaintiff] paid the [s]chool tuition in exchange for an education in
cosmetology, and a significant part of her education included working in [the cosmetology school[‘s]
clinic as a student.” 98 F. Supp. 3d 750, 759 (E.D. Pa. 2015). None of these situations has anything to
do with college football and basketball players on revenue-generating teams. The legal statements in
these cases about the profitability of the employer involved are inapposite and inapplicable to the issue
of profit generation in the context of a revenue-generating college football or basketball team because
the parts of the FLSA involved are not the same. Nor can these college athletes be analogized to student
trainees, volunteers at dance music festivals, or public social service workers. College football and
basketball players in Division I and FBS schools are at the very heart of the commercial enterprise
involved. The better they play, the more money, in the millions, the school makes. Any test labelled an
“economic reality” test must recognize the strength of the commercial, employer-employee, relationship
involved here.
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C. Emerging State Legislation Related to Elite College Athlete Pay
and the NCAA’s Response: O’Bannon Matures and Another Step is Taken
toward College Athlete “Employee” Status
On September 9, 2019, the California Assembly passed a bill, SB 206
“The Fair Pay to Play Act,” allowing student athletes in California colleges
to hire agents and be paid for the use of their name, image, or likeness.53
The bill also prohibited colleges from taking away scholarships of players
who are paid for their name, image, or likeness. 54 Not too long after the
California law, Florida, too, took up similar legislation.55 As a
consequence, the NCAA very recently agreed to allow college athletes to
earn money for name, image, likeness rights while adamantly maintaining
college athletes are not employees. 56 While the NCAA announced that it
will allow athletes to benefit from the use of their name, image, likeness,
probably to forestall any further state legislation, the NCAA has not yet
developed a plan to allow those payments. 57 The NCAA Board of
Governors has “directed each of the NCAA’s three divisions to create the
necessary new rules and have them in place by 2021.” 58 It is hard to
imagine what rules the NCAA might devise that will not further dilute their
claim that student athletes in revenue generating sports are amateurs and
not employees of a college or university. The Ninth Circuit, in striking
down a proposed fund that would make name, image, likeness payments to
student athletes upon graduation, in the O’Bannon case, said the following:
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53. See Berkowitz, supra note 5.
54. Wolf, supra note 5.
55. See Calvan, supra note 6. The Florida proposed legislation is modelled after California’s. The
biggest football states are likely to follow since none of them wants to cede a recruiting advantage.
Indeed, as of the time of the writing of this article, bills modeled on California’s have been passed or
proposed in Illinois, New Jersey, Georgia, and Wisconsin. Not surprisingly, the NCAA was quick to
change course after the possibility of Florida legislation was announced. See Russo, supra note 6. The
NCAA Board of Governors will allow student athletes to receive pay for use of their NIL. However, the
NCAA Board “is emphasizing that change must be consistent with the values of college sports and
higher education and not turn student-athletes into employees of institutions. Id.
56. See Russo, supra note 6.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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The difference between offering student-athletes education-related
compensation and offering them cash sums untethered to educational
expenses is not minor; it is a quantum leap. Once that line is crossed, we
see no basis for returning to a rule of amateurism and no defined
stopping point; we have little doubt that plaintiffs will continue to
challenge the arbitrary limit imposed by the district court until they have
captured the full value of their NIL. At that point the NCAA will have
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surrendered its amateurism principles entirely and transitioned from its
“particular brand of football” to minor league status. 59

II. COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY “WORK-STUDY” PROGRAMS AS A
TEMPLATE FOR PAYING ELITE COLLEGE ATHLETES
A. The Federal Work Study Program
1. Overview
The Federal Work-Study Program provides college students the
opportunity to earn up-to an awarded amount based on their financial
need. 60 The goal of the program is to help both undergraduate and graduate
students pay for their education expenses. 61 While the program encourages
students to work in community focused placements or in their field of
study, students are not limited to those jobs. 62 Students may work at either
on-campus or off-campus placements. 63 In determining a student’s work
placement the following factors are relevant: (1) “the student’s financial
need”; (2) “the number of hours per week the student can work”; (3) “the
period of employment”; (4) “the anticipated wage rate”; and (5) the
“amount of other assistance available to the student.”64 These same factors
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59. O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 1078-79. The only real strategy for the NCAA might be to cut its
losses in the way suggested in this article. Separate college athletes in revenue generating sports
programs from the rest. For these athletes there should be a robust program of compensation across the
three categories of earnings delineated by the trial court in the O’Bannon case: 1) Use of NIL in live
game telecasts; 2) Use of NIL in Video Games; and 3) Use of NIL in Game Rebroadcasts,
Advertisements, and Other Archival Footage. See O’Bannon I, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 968-71. The great bulk
of these monies, one would imagine, would go to athletes and teams in Division I college basketball and
FBS college football Power 5 Conferences. Some residual amount may go to other colleges in the
context of live game telecasts and rebroadcasts (for example, when the occasional DIII or DII team
plays a college powerhouse). These might be placed in some sort of escrow account and paid to
students in non-revenue generating programs upon graduation while the others, acknowledged
employees, would receive real-time payments from the schools along with work study checks for their
labor on the college football or basketball team. The amateurism argument made with respect to athletes
in non-revenue generating sports may have a chance of prevailing. Despite payments out of these funds
to “employees,” the NCAA may still be able to justify substantial caps on payments, limiting payments
to smaller amounts like $5,000 (or even capping wages at the minimum wage level) on the theory that
these restraints may be procompetitive, as Chief Justice Thomas argued in his dissent in O’Bannon,
crediting expert testimony in the trial court on this point.
60. Federal Work-Study Jobs Help Students Earn Money to Pay for College or Career School,
U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/work-study [https://perma.cc/P825-L3WJ]
[hereinafter FWS Jobs Help Students Earn Money] (last visited Dec. 16, 2019).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Info. for Fin. Aid Profs., The Federal Work-Study Program, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. 6-39 (2018),
https://ifap.ed.gov/fsahandbook/attachments/1819FSAHdbkVol6Ch2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C6PBG9Z8].
64. Id.
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must be considered when determining the amount of a student’s award.65 A
student’s financial award letter dictates the number of hours that the student
may work. 66 On average, students work between nine and twenty hours per
week with most schools barring students from working over twenty hours
per week.67 Students are given the freedom to work multiple jobs with their
work-study award, although, they have to split their awarded number of
hours between each job. 68
Students are allowed to work during periods which they are not
enrolled in classes including over summer or Christmas break. 69 However,
the student must be enrolled or planning to enroll during the next period of
enrollment.70 If a student fails to attend that next period of enrollment, the
school must be able to show that “the school had reason to believe the
student intended to study at that school in the next period of enrollment.” 71
2. Funding
The federal government subsidizes the Federal Work-Study Program
by providing up-to 75% of the wages paid to students.72 Schools and/or
employers must pay the remaining 25% of the students’ wages, however,
they may choose to pay up to 50%.73 In the case of placements with offcampus, for-profit jobs, the Federal Work-Study Program may only provide
up-to 50% of the students’ wages.74 Schools are also barred from providing
more than 25% of the total amount allocated to them for the year at forprofit placements. 75 These ratios vary from school to school. For example,
at Stanford, the school and the federal government subsidize 90% of the
42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 104 Side B
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65. Id.
66. Federal Work Study, CORNELL UNIV., https://studentemployment.cornell.edu/federal-workstudy (last visited Dec. 16, 2019) [https://perma.cc/UB9K-VKDT].
67. Id.; Student Emp. Off., How Many Hours May a Student Work?, BATES C.,
https://www.bates.edu/student-employment/for-supervisors/policies/how-many-hours-may-a-studentwork/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2019) [https://perma.cc/8NRB-AES2]; 2018-19 Term-Time Federal WorkStudy Program Application, HARV. MED. SCH., https://meded.hms.harvard.edu/files/hms-meded/files/term-time_fws_application_2018-19.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2019) [https://perma.cc/4WRNBJ53].
68. Student
Emp.
Off.,
Federal
Work
Study
Program,
HARV.
UNIV.,
https://seo.harvard.edu/federal-work-study-program
(last
visited
Dec.
16,
2019)
[https://perma.cc/7JY7-UYC4].
69. Info. for Fin. Aid Profs., supra note 63.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PROGRAMS: FEDERAL WORK-STUDY (FWS) PROGRAM,
https://www2.ed.gov/programs/fws/index.html [https://perma.cc/A5BH-QNUF].
73. CORNELL UNIV., supra note 66.
74. Info. for Fin. Aid Profs., supra note 63.
75. Id.
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students’ wages in non-profit placements and the employer covers the
remaining 10%. 76 In contrast, at Harvard Medical School, the school and
federal government subsidize 70% of the students’ wages and the employer
covers the remaining 30%.77 Schools can pay their share of the wages from
their own funds or from outside sources including off-campus employers. 78
The federal funds are not allowed to be used to provide “fringe
benefits” such as sick leave, paid-time off, or workers compensation. 79
However, schools can use their own funds to provide such benefits to
students. 80 Another limitation on the use of federal funds, is that at least 7%
of the federal funds allocated to a school in a given year must be used to
pay students in community service jobs. 81 Also, a minimum of one student
per year must be employed as either a reading tutor or in a family literacy
project. 82 Schools may request waivers for these requirements, however,
the difficulty of placing a student in one of these roles or in community
service placements generally may not be the basis for a waiver.83 Further, if
schools pay for their share of the federal work-study program through noncash sources such as books, tuition, fees, etc., the school can pay a federal
work-study student through credit on their school account without written
authorization from the student.84
3. Wages

06/12/2020 13:18:38

76. STANFORD UNIV., HAAS CENTER FOR PUBLIC SERVICE: COMMUNITY SERVICE WORKSTUDY),
https://haas.stanford.edu/students/cardinal-quarter/community-service-work-study-csws
[https://perma.cc/Y6LD-HM26].
77. HARV. MED. SCH., supra note 67.
78. See Info. for Fin. Aid Profs., supra note 63.
79. Id. at 6-47.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 6-57.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 6-58.
84. Id. at 6-51.
85. U.S.
DEP’T
OF
EDUC.,
FEDERAL
WORK-STUDY
(FWS)
PROGRAM,
https://www2.ed.gov/programs/fws/index.html [https://perma.cc/DDR2-CL78] (last modified Apr. 17,
2014); Haas Ctr. for Pub. Serv., Community Service Work-Study (CSWS), STAN. U.,
https://haas.stanford.edu/students/cardinal-quarter/community-service-work-study-csws
[https://perma.cc/7VVZ-3EKX] (last visited Dec. 16, 2019).
86. Info. for Fin. Aid Profs., supra note 63, at 6-46.
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The program mandates that students are paid at least minimum wage,
though some schools pay students upwards of $19/hour. 85 If the state or
local minimum wage is higher than the federal minimum wage, schools are
held to the state or local minimum wage.86 The Federal Student Aid
Handbook specifically dictates that while the Small Business Job
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87. Id.
88. Id. at 6-44.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 6-46.
92. Id. at 6-47.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Off. Fin. Aid & Student Emp., Your FWS Earnings, CORNELL UNIV.,
https://studentemployment.cornell.edu/federal-work-study/your-fws-earnings [https://perma.cc/BV4L5SH6] (last visited Dec. 16, 2019).
96. FWS Jobs Help Students Earn Money, supra note 60.
97. Id.
98. Info. for Fin. Aid Profs., supra note 63, at 6-50.
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Protection Act of 1996 allows employers to pay wages under the federal
minimum wage when individuals are in training, schools may not pay
students less than minimum wage under this law. 87 A student may receive
academic credit for his or her work-study position, however, students may
not receive less pay than they would if they were not receiving credit. 88 The
only circumstance under which a student may be paid less than minimum
wage is if the student is receiving academic credit for the work-study
position, and the employer would not normally pay someone for the same
job. 89 Similarly, a student cannot be paid if they are “receiving instruction
in a classroom, laboratory, or other academic setting.” 90
When deciding a student’s wages, schools must use the following
factors: (1) “the skills needed to perform the job”; (2) “how much persons
with those skills are paid in the local area for doing the same type of job”;
(3) “rates the school would normally pay similar non-FWS employees”;
and (4) “any applicable federal, state, or local laws that require a specific
wage rate.” 91 Schools are not allowed to base or determine a student’s
wage rate on financial need. 92 Further, “if a student’s skill level depends on
his or her academic advancement, the school may pay a student on that
basis.” 93 In most cases, though, a student who is performing comparable
work to an employee should be paid a comparable amount.94 The wages
students are paid for work-study are taxable income and, thus, students are
required to report work-study wages on their annual income forms. 95
Students must be paid hourly, with the exception of graduate students who
can be salaried employees. 96 Further, the school is required to pay students
directly at least once a month.97 Federal work-study compensation can be
paid directly to a student through an electronic funds transfer, by issuing a
check (or a similar method), or if the student has given written
authorization, the school can credit the payment to the student’s account. 98
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However, if a credit to a student’s account exceeds the amount the student
owes in the account, the school must pay the student the remaining balance
directly as soon as possible or at the most, 14 days after the account
showed a credit balance. 99 “Regardless of who employs the student, the
school is responsible for making sure the student is paid for work
performed.” 100 Because work-study students are deemed employees either
of the university or of whatever employer the student works for, they are
eligible for worker’s compensation among other benefits. 101
Students may be paid for training and travel related to their workstudy positions. 102 Regardless of the job type, federal work-study students
can be paid up to around 20 hours of training time as well as time for
ongoing preparation and evaluations that are “needed to accomplish” their
work-study jobs. 103 Further, students may be compensated for “a
reasonable amount of time for travel that is directly related to employment
in community service activities.” 104 Although, schools are encouraged to
have students log their travel time separately from their work-time. 105
B. Work-Study’s Applicability to College Athletes in RevenueGenerating Sports
1. Accommodating Revenue-Generating College Athletes within the
definition of Employee under FLSA for the purpose of Work-Study
A number of payment mechanisms for college athletes have been
proposed over the years by scholars. 106 They are by and large clever and
certainly worth thinking about, but all of them would require creation of a
42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 106 Side A
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99. Id. at 6-52.
100. Id. at 6-46.
101. U. Iowa, Handling Work-Related Injuries of Work-Study Employees, OFF. STUDENT FIN. AID,
https://financialaid.uiowa.edu/studentemployment/employers/employers/injuries (last visited Dec. 16,
2019) [https://perma.cc/DL53-W6NR].
102. Info. for Fin. Aid Profs., supra note 63, at 6-55.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., William W. Berry III, Employee-Athletes, Antitrust, and the Future of College
Sports, 28 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 245, 271-72 (2017); David A. Grenardo, The Duke Model: A
Performance Based Solution for Compensating College Athletes, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 157, 163-64
(2017); William W. Berry III, Amending Amateurism: Saving Intercollegiate Athletics Through
Conference Athlete Revenue-Sharing, 68 ALA. L. REV. 551, 556 (2016); Roger M. Groves, A Solution
for the Pay for Play Dilemma of College Athletes: A Novel Compensation Structure Tethered to
Amateurism and Education, 17 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 101, 117 (2016); Michael N. Widener,
Compensating College Athletes in “Store Credit,” 47 U. MEM. L. REV. 431, 436-38 (2016); Thomas R.
Hurst & J. Grier Pressly III, Payment of Student-Athletes: Legal & Practical Obstacles, 7 VILL. SPORTS
& ENT. L.J. 55, 78-82 (2000); C. Peter Gopelrud, Pay for Play for College Athletes: Now, More than
Ever, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 1081, 1089 (1997).
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107. 843 F.3d 285, 293 (7th Cir. 2016).
108. 250 F. Supp. 3d 401 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
109. No. 17-4271, 2018 WL 3609839 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
110. 843 F.3d at 289.
111. 250 F. Supp. 3d at 402-03.
112. 2018 WL 3609839, at *1.
113. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FIELD OPERATIONS HANDBOOK §10(b)(24)(b) (March 31, 2016),
https://www.dol.gov/whd/FOH/FOH_Ch10.pdf [hereinafter FIELD OPERATIONS HANDBOOK]. See also
Berger, 283 F.3d at 292-93; Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 406-407; Livers, 2018 WL 3609839 at *3-*4.
114. See FIELD OPERATIONS HANDBOOK, supra note 113.
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new administrative structure independent of current college and university
organization. However, the Federal Work Study program can serve as an
effective template for paying elite college athletes for their “work” on the
playing field. Since the work study program exists within each university
and has a history that would provide answers or solutions to almost any
wrinkle or complication that might arise in the context of paying college
athletes, it can easily be adapted to this end.
Indeed, a trio of cases brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) have analogized college athlete participation in their respective
college sports to work done by students on campus as part of the federal
work study program. These three cases, the aforementioned Berger v.
NCAA, 107 Dawson v. NCAA, 108and Livers v. NCAA, 109 all involved college
athletes suing their respective colleges and universities for failing to pay
them the minimum wage for their “work” on the athletic field of play. In
Berger, two former women’s track and field stars, Gillian Berger and
Taylor Hennig, were the lead plaintiffs in a class action lawsuit against the
NCAA along with the University of Pennsylvania (their alma mater) and
over 120 other NCAA Division I colleges and universities. 110 In Dawson,
the lead plaintiff in another class action suit, Lamar Dawson, had been a
college football player for the University of Southern California (USC). He
sued not only the NCAA but also the PAC 12 Conference (USC is a
member of the PAC 12). 111 In Livers, plaintiff “Poppy” Livers, pursuing an
FLSA claim by himself against the NCAA and Villanova University, was a
former Division I football player at Villanova.112
The reason that the federal work study program is referenced in all of
these lawsuits is that the Department of Labor Field Operations Handbook
(FOH) defines federal work study students as “employees” for purposes of
federal employment laws like the FLSA, and, simultaneously, defines
college athletes as those involved in extracurricular activities who should
not be viewed as employees and thus receive no pay. 113 Section 10b24(b)
defines circumstances in which an employment relationship will exist
between colleges and students. 114 In that subsection, students who
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participate in work study programs are generally considered “employees”
for FLSA purposes. “[A]n employment relationship will generally exist
with regard to students whose duties are not part of an overall educational
program and who receive some compensation. Thus, students who work at
food service counters or sell programs or usher at athletic events, or who
wait on tables or wash dishes in dormitories in anticipation of some
compensation (money, meals, etc.) are generally considered employees
under the Act.” 115
By contrast, Section 10b24(a) of the FOH states, “University or
college students who participate in activities generally recognized as
extracurricular are not considered to be employees within the meaning of
the Act.” Section 10b03(e) defines extracurricular activities as:
activities in connection with dramatics, student publications, glee clubs,
bands, choirs, debating teams, radio stations, intramural and
interscholastic athletics and other similar endeavors. Activities of
students in such programs, conducted primarily for the benefit of the
participants as a part of the educational opportunities provided to the
students by the school or institution, are not work of the kind
contemplated by section 3(g) of the Act and do not result in an
employer-employee relationship between the student and the school or
institution. 116

Id.
Id. at § 10b24(a), 10b03(e) (emphasis added).
Id.; see also Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285, 292-93 (7th Cir. 2016).

06/12/2020 13:18:38

115.
116.
117.
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Thus, work study students working at a food service counter are
employees because they are working to benefit the school and not
themselves, while students employed in extracurricular activities benefit
themselves and not the school. 117
Any attempts by courts, the NCAA, and colleges and universities to
argue that revenue generating sports like college basketball or football are
there exclusively for the benefit of the students and not the school should
be met with a considerable degree of skepticism. It may be true that in the
1950’s and 1960’s all college and university athletic programs operated at a
loss, and sports opportunities were provided by schools as part of an effort
to educate the whole person and feed not only mind but body as well. With
respect to substantial revenue generating sports like Division I college
football and basketball, those days are long gone. Programs generating
revenue in the millions of dollars have become a substantial source of
revenue to fund many college programs. To say that a dishwasher in the
school cafeteria is an employee, but a UCLA football player is not because
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the dishwasher works for the benefit of the school while the football player
does not is really the height of absurdity. The relationship between college
football and basketball players and colleges and universities in revenue
generating sports is clearly commercial in nature, and only incidentally
academic and for the benefit of the student. This is proved by the Regional
Director’s findings in the Northwestern University case 118 and by the Ninth
Circuit’s observations and conclusions in O’Bannon. 119
A simple change in Department of Labor regulations will allow law to
align properly with the economic reality of the relationship between
revenue generating college athletes. The following changes should be made
in the two provisions applying to the work study program. First, Section
10b24(b) of the Department of Labor Field Operations Handbook should
be modified to expressly acknowledge: “An employment relationship will
generally exist with regard to students whose duties are not part of an
overall educational program and who receive some compensation. Thus,
students who work as athletes in revenue generating athletic programs or
at food service counters or sell programs or usher at athletic events, or who
wait on tables or wash dishes in dormitories in anticipation of some
compensation (money, meals, etc.) are generally considered employees
under the Act.” 120 Second, the Handbook’s definition of extracurricular
activity in Section 10b03(e) should be changed accordingly. Extracurricular
activities should be defined as:

2. The Alt-Labor Future: The Federal Work-Study Program as a
Model for Paying Student-Athletes
Modeling the pay structure for student-athletes after the Federal
Work-Study Program (FWS), schools would be required to pay student-

06/12/2020 13:18:38

118. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
120. See FIELD OPERATIONS HANDBOOK, supra note 113. Proposed modification to the existing
language is highlighted in bold and italics.
121. Id. at §§ 10(b)(24)(a), 10(b)(03)(e) (emphasis added).
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activities in connection with dramatics, student publications, glee clubs,
bands, choirs, debating teams, radio stations, intramural and
interscholastic athletics (but not interscholastic athletics involving
sports that generate revenue for colleges and universities) and other
similar endeavors. Activities of students in such programs, conducted
primarily for the benefit of the participants as a part of the educational
opportunities provided to the students by the school or institution, are not
work of the kind contemplated by section 3(g) of the Act and do not
result in an employer-employee relationship between the student and the
school or institution. 121
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122. Info. for Fin. Aid Profs., supra note 63, at 6-46.
123. Id.
124. Id. When deciding a student’s wages in the Federal Work-Study program, schools must utilize
the following factors: (1) “the skills needed to perform the job”; (2) “how much persons with those
skills are paid in the local area for doing the same type of job”; (3) “rates the school would normally
pay similar non-FWS employees”; and (4) “any applicable federal, state, or local laws that require a
specific wage rate.”
125. Id. at 6-47.
126. Id. The Federal Work-Study Program states that “if a student’s skill level depends on his or
her academic advancement, the school may pay a student on that basis.”
127. Id.
128. Id. at 6-55.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 6-54.
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athletes at least minimum wage. 122 If the state or local minimum wage is
higher than the federal minimum wage, schools would be held to the state
or local minimum wage.123 Schools would determine a student-athlete’s
wages based on: (1) the skills required for the particular sport and position
that the athlete plays; (2) how much other athletes with similar skills in
similar positions are paid; (3) if the athlete was not a student, how much
would the school have to pay for their position; and (4) if there are any
additional laws at the federal, state, or local level that dictate the particular
athlete’s pay rate.124 Schools would not be allowed to determine a studentathlete’s wages based on financial need. 125 Schools could pay studentathletes on a performance basis, however, they would still be required to
pay the student at least minimum-wage.126 In most cases, student-athletes
would be paid a comparable amount to non-student athletes of similar skill
levels. 127 However, this proposal envisions that student-athletes would only
be paid minimum wage for their work study jobs as athletes. When the
grant-in-aid scholarship monies are included as compensation (which will
most likely be the case if these students are viewed as employees), then
final compensation will be well above the minimum wage.
Further, student-athletes could be paid for training and travel related to
their positions.128 In such a case, student-athletes would be paid for their
practice time as well as their travel time to and from various games and
competitions.129 Student-athletes would also be eligible to be paid during
times in which they are not enrolled in courses, but when they are doing
work related to the athletic team they are involved with, such as over
summer break when they might be working out or learning the playbook
under supervision, as long as they are enrolled or are planning to enroll in
courses during the next period of enrollment. 130
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131. Undergraduate students in the work-study program are paid hourly while graduate students
are paid either hourly or as a salaried employee. Federal Work-Study jobs help students earn money to
pay for college or career school. See FWS Jobs Help Students Earn Money, supra note 60.
132. Info. for Fin. Aid Profs., supra note 63, at 6-50, 6-46.
133. Id. at 6-52.
134. Id. at 6-47.
135. See id.
136. See supra notes 72-78.
137. See Gould IV et al., supra note 39, at 52-62; Omar A. Bareentto, NCAA, It’s Time to Pay the
Piper: The Aftermath of O’Bannon v. NCAA and Northwestern v. CAPA, 12 RUTGERS BUS. L. REV. 1,
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Schools would have the option to pay student-athletes hourly or by
salary, as long as they are meeting minimum-wage requirements.131 It
would be the school’s responsibility to ensure that student-athletes are paid
directly at least once a month, and only by written authorization of the
student could the school pay a student-athlete through his or her student
account.132 Even if a student does authorize the school to pay his or her
wages through credits to his or her account, if there is ever a credit balance
in the account, the school would be required to pay the student the credit
amount within fourteen days of the credit appearing. 133
Because student-athletes would be employees of the University, they
would be eligible for “fringe benefits” such as sick leave, paid-time off,
healthcare, and workers compensation.134 Therefore, if a school provided
student-athletes with workers compensation and the student-athlete was
injured, workers compensation would cover the healthcare costs related to
the incident.135 Remember, fringe benefits are not federally funded, but
provided by the school. This proposal also envisions that the funds for the
program to pay college athletes in revenue generating sports a minimum
wage for work study will come from the schools themselves, not the federal
government, from revenues generated by the play of the athletes in their
respective sports. This is entirely consistent with the current operation of
the work-study program. The federal program contributes money to schools
for work-study payments, but the government is not the sole funder. 136
Schools often provide 50% of funds, and it would be entirely consistent
with the program for a school to cover 100% of the wage cost plus “fringe
benefits.”
The payment of wages to student-athletes through the federal workstudy program may trigger a host of other employment-related obligations.
For example, Title IX may require that student-athletes on some of a
college’s women’s teams may also have to be paid work-study monies.
Also, workers’ compensation, unemployment insurance, and income tax
obligations may be triggered. 137 For these reasons, a study conducted by
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William Gould and Glenn Wong in 2014 concluded that the only schools
that may be able to complete a successful financial transition to a system in
which student athletes are deemed employees at least in the short term are
athletes in Division I Power 5 Conference schools. 138

III. COLLEGE ATHLETES IN REVENUE-GENERATING SPORTS AS
EMPLOYEES AND UNION MEMBERS: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN
COLLEGE SPORTS
A. The NCAA as Joint Employer

06/12/2020 13:18:38

32-33 (2015) (maintaining that while athlete compensation might be taxed, payments in the form of a
scholarship should not be due to an exception from gross income for “any qualified tuition reduction”).
138. See Gould IV et al., supra note 39, at 61.
139. See Lonick, supra note 39, at 140, 162-64.
140. I know I seemed to argue differently in an earlier article, see The Northwestern University
Football Case: A Dissent, 11 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 201, 218-23 (2020), but in that article I was
simply arguing that the NLRB could have found Northwestern University to be the employer and the
football players on the Northwestern team to be in an appropriate bargaining unit. Bargaining would not
have been as meaningful without the NCAA involved, but the parties could well have reached
agreement on any number of issues not conflicting with NCAA rules or the Student Athlete Agreement.
141. 32 N.L.R.B. No. 186 (Aug. 27, 2015).
142. 911 F.3d 1195 (Dec. 28, 2018).
143. Browning Ferris, 32 N.L.R.B. No. 186, at 1613 (2015).
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The NCAA issues and enforces many of the rules governing college
athletes. 139 For any meaningful collective bargaining to take place, the
NCAA would have to be a party in negotiations and a co-signer of any
collectively-bargained agreement. 140 The NCAA qualifies as a joint
employer under any test that might be erected in a labor and employment
context simply because of the substantial and strict control it has over
college athletes. The current joint employer test promulgated by the NLRB,
Browning Ferris Industries of California, 141 was recently upheld by the
United States Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit in Browning-Ferris
Industries of California, Inc. v. NLRB. 142 The new standard provides that
“two or more entities are joint employers of a single work force if they are
both employers within the meaning of common law, and if they share or
co-determine those matters governing essential terms and conditions of
employment.” 143 The new standard expands the joint employer test by
allowing the Board to consider as a relevant factor in determining joint
employer status: 1) whether an employer has “the right to control” the
workforce beyond actually exercising control over it, and 2) whether an
employer has “indirect control” over the workforce beyond exercising
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“direct and immediate” control. The decision places in question Trump
Board efforts to again narrow the joint employer rule since the Court
refused to defer to the NLRB on the question of the joint employer test,
claiming that the test requires an analysis of the common law of agency, a
determination squarely to be made by courts. The Court then found the
Board’s new 2015 standard to be consistent with common law principles.
This means that the new expanded joint employer test is likely to withstand
change efforts by conservative administrations. There is very little doubt
that the NCAA is a joint employer under the new standard if athletes are
“employees” and colleges and universities are “employers.”144 However,
the NCAA is likely a joint employer under the narrower “strict control” test
as well. 145
B. Alt-Labor Future of College Athletics in Revenue-Generating
Sports: Unionization and Collective Bargaining
A future in which college football and basketball players in revenuegenerating programs will be employees will necessarily require
unionization by these athletes and collective bargaining. First, without

42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 109 Side B
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144. Lonick, supra note 39, at 163-64. (“Under the [new joint employer] standard, the extensive
NCAA rules and university compliance requirements exemplify how the two entities ‘share or
codetermine those matters governing the essential terms and conditions of employment.’ As a
preliminary matter, many courts recognize that the student-athlete agreement itself is a binding
contract. . . . It makes no difference which school a player attends because here, NCAA rules are
inescapable. Put differently, all [student-athlete] laborers in college sports are bound by the [NCAA]
contract. The student-athlete agreement and the 96-page NCAA Manual provides structure for the
NCAA’s dependency on the student-athletes, which among other things, control the flow of benefits
from athletes’ labor. . . . The detail of the NCAA bylaws is astounding, there are rules governing
eligibility for participation in a variety of NCAA events, awards and benefits for enrolled studentathletes, scheduling of athletic events, and enforcement principles which include both individual
student-athlete and university punishments.”) (footnotes omitted).
145. Id. at 165-66. (“In summary, even without the new [joint employer] standard, the NCAA
exercises the ‘strict control’. . . to be a joint employer of student-athletes. The NCAA controls the entry
to the workforce—via the Student-Athlete Agreement—and the terms of ongoing employment through
its rules regarding eligibility. Behind its bylaws is a clear threat of action, which shows not only a
‘right’ to control, but the NCAA exercising that right, as seen in countless cases against even the
highest-profile athletes in college sports. Underlying these procedures is the economy of college sports,
which depends on student-athletes agreeing to abide by NCAA rules and forces athletes to sacrifice the
value of their skills on the open market for years. In the aggregate, these circumstances show the NCAA
controls the field that student-athletes work in, and the purpose of the NLRA is served by finding they
are ‘employees’ to the private ‘employer,’ the NCAA.”) (footnotes omitted); Edelman, supra note 39, at
1650-51 (“Yet, even though arguing that the NCAA is a joint employer of college athletes represents a
novel argument, there are myriad factors that point in favor of finding the NCAA to serve as a joint
employer. For example, the NCAA bylaws require all FBS football and Division I men’s basketball
players to sign an identical letter of tender, which includes their ‘terms of employment.’ In addition, the
NCAA bylaws set forth uniform rules for financially compensating college athletes. Finally, the NCAA
even has enforced nationwide rules pertaining to academic eligibility and drug testing—evidence of the
NCAA’s actual control over college athlete conduct at both private and public colleges.”).
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unionization of, and collective bargaining with, these athletes, the NCAA
will not be able to sustainably weather what will be crippling antitrust
liability. The NCAA rules set out in its Student Athlete Agreement and its
96-page manual will not withstand antitrust scrutiny in its current form. 146
Second, a collective approach through unionization and collective
bargaining is likely the only way for the NCAA to contain and control what
would be a wage war between schools. The federal work study program
only sets a floor for wages (the federal minimum wage), but schools can
pay students whatever they want above the minimum. In the cutthroat arena
of competition by colleges, particularly in Division I Power 5 Conferences,
for the top recruits in both football and basketball, wage competition will
soar as soon as these students are deemed employees unless a containment
mechanism in a collective bargaining agreement governed wage practices,
much like collective agreements in professional football and basketball
control overall player salaries in those sports. It is possible, though, that the
NCAA could put caps on wages and compensation and argue that those
restraints are necessary to maintain the popularity of football and basketball
to the consumer. In other words, the restraints would be procompetitive. 147
Those restraints could then possibly exist independent of the collective
agreement.
1. Process: What will be the Extent and Scope of College Athlete
Unionization and Collective Bargaining?
On the employee side, it probably makes the most sense for any
college athlete union to be as big as possible in order to take advantage of
42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 110 Side A
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146. See Michael H. LeRoy, How A “Labor Dispute” Would Help the NCAA, 81 U. CI. L. REV.
DIALOGUE 44, 45-46 (2014) (“In the long run, antitrust liability poses a bigger threat to NCAA interests
than does player unionization. Therefore, it is in the NCAA’s interest to embrace the unionrepresentation process; engage in ‘hard bargaining,’ particularly because its bargaining strength is pitted
against the weak bargaining power of college athletes; and anticipate implementing the terms and
conditions of a collective bargaining agreement. By taking these actions, the NCAA would create a
‘labor dispute’ with players—and, according to the strictures of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the
Clayton Act, such a dispute would shield it from an injunction and potent antitrust remedies.”);
Edelman, supra note 39, at 1655, 1660 (“The ‘non-statutory labor exemption’ is a court-created
exemption from antitrust law that insulates from scrutiny certain concerted conduct in labor
markets. . . . [I]t is unlikely that the unionizing of a single college sports team would derail an antitrust
lawsuit against the NCAA in any circuit. Simply stated, applying the exemption would not serve its
core, intended purpose of protecting collective bargaining. Meanwhile, the greater the number of teams
within any particular bargaining unit, the more likely that the ‘non-statutory labor exemption’ would
preempt antitrust litigation under both the Majority View and the Second Circuit View.”) (footnotes
omitted).
147. According to one of the experts at the trial court level in O’Bannon, the payment of small
amounts of compensation to athletes should not affect consumer taste for the sport, and hence would not
be anticompetitive. See, e.g., O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 1079 (Thomas, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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the most leverage possible for any negotiations. Thus, most likely, any
union suitor will try to organize one separate union involving all of the
schools in the Division I Power 5 Conferences in football and basketball. 148
On the employer side it might be a bit trickier. The NCAA would
most likely want the biggest multiemployer unit possible, and that might
mean that it would want to negotiate and have all the schools together. This
would allow for maximum leverage and would in the end create a single
collective agreement, just like in professional football and basketball. A
multiemployer group including all the schools and the NCAA will mean it
will be much easier to set a cap on wages as well as other subjects of
bargaining like healthcare that would apply to everyone. The NLRB, which
would arguably have either jurisdiction or effective jurisdiction over
everyone, including the public schools, if the NCAA is a joint employer, 149
has indicated, too, that it is concerned about labor stability in the context of
college football and would favor a larger unit.150 However, the NLRB
explicitly left open in the Northwestern University case the question of the
size of the bargaining unit, emphasizing that even a single college team
unit, like Northwestern’s, may be appropriate in the future. 151
Nonetheless, given the money involved and the stakes generally,
individual conferences and even individual schools might want to go it
alone. While it is generally true that the Power 5 Conferences earn enough
revenue through college football and basketball to be able to transition to
an alt-labor world in which athletes are employees who share in program
revenues, 152 individual schools within those conferences and individual
42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 110 Side B
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148. Intercollegiate basketball organizing might be a bit more difficult to predict since there are a
few teams outside the Power 5 Conferences that are ranked each year and are perennial contenders at
the NCAA tournament. Some of these schools, including, for example, Gonzaga and Xavier, might be
added to any list for potential organizing by a college union.
149. See Lonick, supra note 39, at 164-65 (arguing that the NCAA as a private employer
controlling public and private colleges and universities may be viewed by the NLRB as a locus of
control allowing the NLRB to assert jurisdiction over the NCAA and then through it to public
institutions); but cf. Edelman, supra note 39, at 1648-49 (“If union organizers attempt to establish a
multi-employer bargaining unit that includes all of the private colleges from within a single athletic
conference (or multiple athletic conferences), the NLRB would likely have limited concern about
‘stability in labor relations.’ Indeed, this approach would likely lead to either the separation of the
unionized schools into an independent, sustainable athletic conference, or an agreement by the nonunionized schools to voluntarily provide their athletes with the same terms of employment as schools
where the athletes have the right to collectively bargain.”).
150. See Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. 1350, 1355 n.28 (Aug. 17, 2015).
151. Id. at 1354 n.16; see also Edelman, supra note 39, at 1640.
152. See, e.g., Gould IV et al., supra note 39, at 58 (“However, it is important to note that the
significant increase in revenues is already in place for schools in the Power Five conferences. This
includes television contracts and revenues from the College Football playoff system. The schools in the
Power Five conferences should clearly be able to afford significant increased benefits to student-
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conferences within the Power 5 earn more revenue than others.153 Thus,
individual schools and conferences may try to break away from the others
to achieve an advantage in recruitment. To a certain extent this is already
materializing with respect to the stipends schools may now award to
student-athletes as a result of the O’Bannon case allowing schools to pay
student athletes an amount beyond a full scholarship that reflects the full
cost of attending college. 154 One might imagine that a Notre Dame, an
Alabama, an Ohio State, or a UCLA might well want to conduct their own
negotiations and have their own agreement with players as to wages paid
while signing on to any broad collective agreement for other terms and
conditions of employment. So long as they pay more than the minimum
required by any collective agreement, they would presumably be able to do
so. 155 Teams may splinter along conference lines within the Power 5 as
well. For example, if the SEC is much more well-heeled than the other
Power 5 Conferences, as one suspects they might be, it might choose to try
to encourage the NLRB to find an SEC-wide unit to be appropriate for
purposes of unionization and collective bargaining. As a result of this, the
NCAA may possibly try to cap wages independent of the collective
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athletes (and this is without reducing the expense side of significant coaching salaries for coaches and
staff, as well as significant facilities investments).”).
153. Id. (“Beyond the twenty programs in the Power Five conferences that reported a positive net
generated revenue in 2013, the remaining 100 or so FBS institutions will face significant financial
challenges [in converting to a system where student-athletes are employees] likely to have a substantial
impact on their athletic department revenues. This group of institutions includes most of the forty-five
remaining schools from the Power Five conferences.”).
154. See Jon Solomon, Alabama’s Cost of Attendance Stipend Will Rank Among Highest,
CBSSPORTS.COM (July 24, 2015), https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/alabamas-cost-ofattendance-stipend-will-rank-among-highest-in-nation/ [https://perma.cc/Y9G8-C5UD] (“Alabama’s
cost of attendance stipends will rank among the leaders nationally at $5,386 for out-of-state players and
$4,172 for in-state players, according to information the university provided to CBSSports.com. . . . For
years, athletic scholarships have not covered what university financial aid offices list as the full cost of
attending college. That changes this August when athletic scholarships can include not only the
traditional tuition, room, board, books and fees, but also incidental costs of attending college.”). See
also Hank Kurz, Jr., Stipend is helpful, moral, necessary, Denver Post, Nov. 1, 2018, p. 7B; Will
Hudson, Cost of attendance stipends show which sports colleges want to spend on, The Washington
Post, May 22, 2015 (“The new “cost-of-attendance” stipends — money for gas, groceries, travel home
and other similar expenses incurred by college students — are optional, and based on school financial
aid office estimates. They vary widely between schools, but generally fall in the range of $2,000 to
$5,000. . . . In and around Washington, how colleges are handling the stipends provides a microcosm of
how this change is playing out across Division I, the financially disparate top tier of college athletics
that includes wealthy powerhouses such as Texas and smaller institutions such as Howard. Many big
schools in the so-called “power five conferences” are giving the extra spending money to all scholarship
athletes, while some schools in smaller conferences are providing the stipends only to basketball
players, or are declining to offer them altogether.”).
155. See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944) (noting that individual contracts may
add to, but not subtract from, collectively bargained contracts where there is great variation in the
capacity of employees).
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bargaining agreement and take their chances with antitrust liability since
they conceivably can argue that such restraints might be procompetitive.
2. Substance: What will Athletes, Colleges, and the NCAA Bargain
About?

06/12/2020 13:18:38

156. See Katie Shonk, For NFL Players, a win-win only in retrospect, HARV. L. SCH. PROGRAM
NEGOTIATION BLOG (Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/win-win-daily/for-nflplayers-a-win-win-contract-only-in-retrospect/ [https://perma.cc/BDN2-2AWS].
157. Id.
158. See Adam Gopnik, Team Spirit, NEW YORKER (May 12, 2014) (“The rationale for the
players’ demands, which include concussion-testing, extended medical coverage, and more manageable
practice schedules, is based on a real inequity.”); see also Gould IV et al., supra note 39, at 61.
ON
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Speculation about what elite student athletes and their union would
want to negotiate about is not difficult. In fact, for guidance, one need not
look much farther than the collective bargaining agreement between
players and the NFL or the NBA. The revenue picture is very similar
between college and professional football and basketball. Revenues include
ticket sales; broadcast and rebroadcast rights; name, image and likeness
(NIL) payments; and merchandising money. The NFL and NBA
agreements also deal with player salaries, including salary caps. Likewise,
any college agreement will probably discuss wages and scholarships, and
the colleges and NCAA will likely insist on a wage cap for students. This
cap might be as low as the minimum wage, depending upon whether the
NCAA imposes such a cap or how much students will earn from other
sources of revenue like NIL income and broadcast revenue. The most
recent NFL agreement in 2011 provided for less share for players of locally
generated revenue and merchandising but a greater percentage of TV
broadcast money.156 The NFL team owners were willing to share more of
the money that the teams were not directly responsible for producing, like
TV revenue. 157 College teams might approach bargaining the same way—
allowing college athletes to keep more of the income coming from nonteam/school dedicated sources like TV revenue and NIL monies while
keeping more of ticket revenue, concession revenue, and merchandising
dollars. Whatever revenue is allocated to students can be used to fund work
study programs that will result in wage payments to college athletes.
Another area of possible bargaining will be in the area of healthcare.
Healthcare concerns, including concerns about concussion protocols as
well as the extent of medical coverage for college players, were the primary
reason for the unionization effort at Northwestern University. 158 Here, also,
student concerns coalesce with professional player concerns, at least in
football. In the 2011 NFL collective bargaining agreement, for example,
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professional football players bargained for and received a neurocognitive
benefit for players with concussions and other injuries 159 as well as a
decrease in the number of offseason practices160 and contact practices 161 as
well as the elimination of “two-a-days.” 162 College athletes may also be
concerned about drug abuse and the overuse of pain killers. 163 They may
well want these subjects addressed in any overall agreement.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, college athletes will likely
want to bargain about education. First, the matter of their survival as
students. As the record developed by the Regional Director in the
Northwestern University case shows, these athletes are already controlled
to a significant degree in service of their work for the football team. And
that’s under the present system where they are at least symbolically viewed
as students and amateurs. Imagine the incentives for the schools to trample
educational objectives when students are viewed as “employees” and
therefore “professionals.” There may be protections in some NCAA rules,
but true protection of educational objectives and outcomes will likely flow
from a negotiated agreement. In addition, roughly one-fifth of men’s
college football and basketball athletes fail to graduate, and although that
figure is much lower than in the past, 164 it still might elicit concern by the
players and their union. They might well want a collective agreement to
address the topic.
IV. CONCLUSION

06/12/2020 13:18:38

159. NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE & NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASS’N, 2011 COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT, art. 65 (Aug. 4, 2011).
160. Id. at art. 21.
161. Id. at art. 22 §5, art. 23 §6.
162. Id. at art. 24.
163. See Gould IV et al., supra note 39, at 61 (“Unionization at the college level could have a
dramatic impact, although instead of athlete compensation, the true focus of bargaining may turn out to
be player concerns that are developing at the professional level as well, such as safety, concussions, and
the abuse of painkillers.”).
164. See Michelle Brutlag Hosick, DI student-athletes graduate at record high rates, NAT’L
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N (Oct. 16, 2009, 1:00 PM), https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/news/di-student-athletes-graduate-record-high-rates [https://perma.cc/5Q24-TPV4].
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This article has maintained through an analysis of caselaw and recent
developments involving states and the NCAA that the amateur status of
student-athletes in revenue-generating college sports is no longer
sustainable. The article discussed and analyzed what the future world of
college athletes in revenue-generating sports as “employees” might look
like, and in particular how such a world might be structured. The article has
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shown that these student athletes can be paid through easy assimilation into
existing college “work study” programs. The article has maintained that the
transition from amateurs to employees will likely and necessarily lead to
unionization and collective bargaining involving these particular athletes.
In such a world, the NCAA, the Power 5 Conferences and the individual
schools in those conferences will likely be “joint employers,” and there will
be some issue about what might be appropriate bargaining units within
which to bargain. The article ends by suggesting what might be the likely
subjects of bargaining.
Importantly, this article steadfastly maintains that this future world
must necessarily be a bifurcated one. Most college athletes will and should
remain amateurs. Colleges, universities, the conferences and the NCAA
will not be able to sustain financially an administrative structure in which
all student athletes are viewed as employees. Nor is it necessary. The
incentives for colleges and the NCAA to treat students as employees and
not students, I argue, only exist with respect to those sports that bring in
critical revenues for the college. Those sports are men’s college football
and basketball (and possibly some women’s basketball teams) primarily in
the Power 5 Division I Conferences. Fortunately, the revenues from these
sports are so substantial that they can fund additional payments to these
students for their work in generating this income. The practical and moral
arguments for extending employee status to students in sports that do not
generate this kind of revenue are much harder to make. In addition,
extending employee status to students in non-revenue generating sports
may lead to the elimination of those sports. Men’s college football and
basketball are popular enough to survive the change.
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